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NOTES
THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY: A PRACTICAL MEANS OF
IMPOSING RULE 10b-5 LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The degree of insider trading' has intensified in recent years.2 This in-
tensification is partially due to the current law's failure to provide a clear
standard for imposing liability. Rule 10b-5,3 formulated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934,1 does not contain a clear definition of in-
sider trading. The courts have struggled to define the scope of 10b-5; the
1. Insider trading is generally defined as "trading in the securities market while in posses-
sion of material information that is not available to the general public." Note, United States
v. Carpenter: Second Circuit Overextends the Misappropriation Theory of Criminal Liabil-
ity Under Rule 10b-5, 12 DEL. J. Coap. L. 605, 605 n.1 (1987). Insider trading may be con-
ducted by two distinct groups of investors. These groups are referred to as "traditional" and
"nontraditional" insiders. "'Traditional insiders' are those directors, officers, controlling
shareholders. . . who trade in their own company's securities." Id. at 612. "Nontraditional"
insiders are those who trade while possessing an informational advantage. However, "non-
traditional" insiders are not insiders of the issuer of the securities and they have not im-
properly received information from an insider. Aldave, Misappropriation: A General The-
ory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 112 (1984).
2. From 1984 to 1988, 46 people were indicted for insider trading, while only 11 were
convicted of insider trading between 1934 and 1984. 134 CONG. REc. H7470 (daily ed. Sept.
13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Eckhart).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989). Rule 10b-5 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances in which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
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leading case law demonstrates the difficulty courts have had determining
what constitutes insider trading.
Recently, in United States v. Newman,5 the Second Circuit formulated
the misappropriation theory to overcome the obstacles to imposing liabil-
ity that former case law had constructed. This theory offers a pragmatic
approach to the insider trading crisis by imposing liability on any person
who trades on the basis of wrongfully acquired inside information.7 The
Supreme Court had the opportunity to endorse the misappropriation the-
ory in United States v. Carpenter,8 but being evenly divided on the issue,
the Court did not comment on the theory's validity. Hence, while the Sec-
ond Circuit may temporarily continue to use the theory, uncertainty ex-
ists as to whether the misappropriation theory will become the predomi-
nant theory used in insider trading prosecutions.'
This Note examines the effect of the misappropriation theory in cases
involving trading by nontraditional insiders. It compares the equal access,
fiduciary duty and misappropriation theories, emphasizing the misappro-
priation theory as a superior means of implementing the policy goals of
Rule 10b-5. This Note also assesses the probability that the Supreme
Court will adopt the theory.
II. HISTORY OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. The Rationale Behind Insider Trading Liability
There are two main reasons for imposing liability on those who trade
5. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). In Newman, the Second
Circuit held that an employee who traded on the basis of nonpublic information misappro-
priated from his employer violated 10b-5. By focusing on a duty other than that between a
purchaser and seller of securities, the misappropriation theory endorsed in Newman ex-
pands 10b-5 liability to incorporate the actions of nontraditional insiders. Aldave, supra
note 1, at 112.
6. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court restricted 10b-5 liability
by requiring a fiduciary duty between the 10b-5 violator and the purchaser or seller of the
securities involved. Id. at 232. The Chiarella rule impedes SEC and government prosecutors
who attempt to eradicate insider trading, as much of the trading on nonpublic information
is conducted by people who owe no direct duty to the person to whom they sell or from
whom they buy securities. The Chiarella holding left prosecutors with no means of deterring
the unfair trading activities of these investors.
7. Chief Justice Burger, whose dissent in Chiarella first articulated the fundamental prin-
ciples of the misappropriation theory, emphasized the importance of wrongfulness. Accord-
ing to Burger, anytime "an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience,
foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means," 10b-5 liability should be imposed. Id.
at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
8. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
9. There are two types of prosecutions for insider trading. Following an SEC investiga-
tion, there is an SEC prosecution which can lead to the imposition of civil penalties. The
investigation results may also be used by federal prosecutors in a criminal suit.
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securities on the basis of nonpublic information. First, commentators
stress the need to restore the public's confidence in the securities mar-
ket.10 They fear that investors, aware of the recent surge of insider trad-
ing, will choose to withdraw from the securities market rather than risk
being victims of this unlawful activity.1 Mass withdrawal from the mar-
ket could seriously impair the economy, although some commentators be-
lieve that insider trading is unlikely to stimulate severe economic de-
mise. 2 These commentators find insider trading prohibitions justified by
enforcing fairness in the securities market, a second widely noted ration-
ale for imposing liability.'-
B. The Securities Laws
The desire to instill fairness into securities transactions motivated Con-
gress to enact the Securities Act of 193314 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.15 Congress' goal was "to protect the investing public and
honest business,"' 6 implying a strong desire to ensure a fair price on se-
curities rather than a price distorted by the mechanisms of insider trad-
ing.17 This goal was codified in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 193418 ("1934 Act") which authorized the SEC to formulate Rule
10b-5,19 the main weapon against today's army of insider traders. Con-
gress perceived Rule 10b-5 as a protective device, designed to shield the
investor from the harmful effect of "manipulative or deceptive prac-
tices."' 0 Originally, the congressional focus was on the manipulative or
10. E.g., Phelan, Integrity is a Necessity on Wall St., 197 N.J.L.J. 29 (1987).
11. Cox & Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 354 (1988).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 357.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1988).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 7811 (1988).
16. S. REP. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MA-
HAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEcuRITIEs ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at Item 17 (1973) [hereinafter 2 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR].
17. Transactions in securities are often executed by brokers with a specialist, a person
who makes his living dealing in certain stocks. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic In-
formation on the Impersonal Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom
Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1981). "[A]fter selling to an inside
trader, a specialist ... might increase price quotations; after buying from an inside trader,
a specialist ... might decrease his prices. On organized stock exchanges, changes in special-
ist price quotations would affect the prices of brokers 'trading in the crowd' around the
specialist's booth." Id. at 1239. Thus, the price at which the broker buys or sells will be
altered by the inside trading.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
20. S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 J. ELLENBERGER & E.
MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SEcuRIrms EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at Item 17
(1973) [hereinafter 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR]. The focus of section 10(b) was the elimination
of the frequent transactions in which "directors and large stockholders participated in pools
1990]
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deceptive practices of traditional insiders;2 the problem of trading by
nontraditional insiders was not expressly contemplated by Congress in
1934.22
Since 1934, however, the SEC and the courts have confronted the prob-
lem of nontraditional insiders.2 ' In order to effectively implement the pol-
icy goals of the 1934 Act, the courts expanded the scope of 10b-5 to reach
nontraditional insiders by formulating the equal access theory.
C. Early Case Law: Evolution of the Equal Access Theory
The case which began the era of 10b-5 expansion 24 was In re Cady,
Roberts & Co.25 There, the SEC imposed 10b-5 liability on an investment
banker who traded Curtiss-Wright securities after receiving confidential
information from a Curtiss-Wright director.26 Under a traditional inter-
pretation of 10b-5, the supplier of the information violated the rule be-
cause as a director, the supplier had a duty to the Curtiss-Wright share-
holders . 2 The banker, however, did not have a duty to the shareholders.
The SEC found that the banker violated 10b-5, thereby extending the
"disclose or abstain" rule ' s to nontraditional insiders. The SEC deter-
mined that a person has a duty to disclose or abstain if that person is in a
relationship of trust which gives access to confidential information in-
tended only for a corporate purpose.29 The SEC demonstrated its belief
trading in the stock of their own companies, with the benefit of . . . information not
procurable by the investing public." Id.
21. See supra note 1.
22. Note, Insider Trading: A New Equal Access Approach, 15 J. CONTEMP. L. 51, 54
(1989).
23. See supra note 1.
24. See Note, The SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press: The Legal Implications of
the Misappropriation Theory, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 43, 49 (1986) [hereinafter Note, SEC's
Regulation of the Financial Press]; see also Note, United States v. Carpenter: An Inade-
quate Solution to the Problem of Insider Trading, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1461, 1464
(1988) [hereinafter Note, Inadequate Solution].
25. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
26. Id. at 912.
27. This duty was articulated in the following manner by the SEC:
[I]nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their
position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these
circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other
hand, disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic
under the circumstances ... the alternative is to forego the transaction.
Id. at 911.
28. See id.
29. The relationship of trust requirement implies that a person must owe a fiduciary duty
to the corporation. This duty is acquired by a nontraditional insider when a relationship of
trust exists between the nontraditional insider and a traditional insider, because the duty of
the latter is imposed upon the former. Note, supra note 1, at 614.
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that any trading situation in which a person relies upon facts unavailable
to the other party is inherently unfair by instituting this comprehensive
new standard, which encompassed both traditional and nontraditional
insiders.3 0
This emphasis on fairness led the Second Circuit to establish an equal
access theory of 10b-5 liability in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.3s The
Texas Gulf Sulphur court interpreted 10b-5 as an expression of the con-
gressional intent "that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information. 3 s2 This interpretation
eliminated the relationship of trust requirement of In re Cady. Under the
Texas Gulf Sulphur rule, even a person who inadvertently overheard ma-
terial33 confidential information would incur a duty to disclose or abstain.
The equal access theory removed the obstacle to liability imposed by the
relationship of trust requirement; however, the theory also enabled courts
to award substantial damages to undeserving plaintiffs.
D. The Equal Access Theory Applied in Private Actions
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.3 4 demon-
strated the problem with draconian liability3 5 that resulted from the use
of the equal access theory in private 10b-5 actions. In Shapiro, the de-
fendant tippers were found liable for damages to all plaintiffs who traded
contemporaneously with their tippees.3 The court emphasized the impos-
sibility of identifying a specific defendant's sale with a specific plaintiff's
purchase 37 and noted that its holding furthered the underlying purpose of
10b-5, which was "to prevent inequitable and unfair practices. s3 8 In fact,
the result of the Shapiro decision was not as equitable as the court
claimed, for it permitted any investor fortunate enough to have traded
30. In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
31. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
32. Id. at 848.
33. According to Texas Gulf Sulphur, "The basic test of materiality . . . is whether a
reasonable man would attach importance (to the information) ... in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question." Id. at 849 (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965)).
34. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
35. See Note, Insider Trading and the Corporate Acquirer: Private Actions Under Rule
10b-5 Against Agents Who Trade on Misappropriated Information, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
600, 641-44 (1988).
36. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 237. Merrill Lynch employees, working as underwriters for a
corporation, disclosed confidential information concerning the corporation to their custom-
ers. The customer-tippees traded on the basis of the information and Merrill Lynch was
held liable to all purchasers who traded during the period that these tippees traded. The
tippees were also found to have violated 10b-5. See Note, supra note 1, at 616-17.
37. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 236.
38. Id. at 240.
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when the 10b-5 violators traded to gain a windfall." Forcing one who
profits from insider trading to disgorge the amount he gained from his
illegal conduct conforms with our idea of justice. However, the ends of
justice are not advanced when courts award investors merely for engaging
in normal trading activity at the "right" time.
E. The Fiduciary Duty Theory Replaces the Equal Access Rule
The Supreme Court remedied this problem in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores40 by limiting the potential class of 10b-5 plaintiffs to
people who had purchased or sold the security to which the violation re-
lated.41 The Court sought to avert the danger of "vexatious litigation"
resulting from the application of the Texas Gulf Sulphur rule to private
actions, by making the buyer-seller fiduciary relationship an absolute pre-
requisite to recovery.42 Cases following Blue Chip Stamps narrowed the
scope of Rule 10b-5 even further ' by establishing that violations of the
law occur only where the insider's activity was fraudulent.44 By making
the fraud45 element of 10b-5 indispensable, the Court dealt the first criti-
cal blow to the equal access theory.
The Supreme Court completely abrogated the equal access theory in
Chiarella v. United States.46 The Second Circuit upheld the conviction of
Chiarella for 10b-5 violations resulting from trading on the basis of non-
public information which he acquired through his job with a financial
printing company. 47 In reversing Chiarella's conviction, the Court rejected
the equal access rule.4 8 The Court held that "a duty to disclose under
Section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic mar-
ket information. 49 The majority noted that silence was not fraudulent in
39. See Note, supra note 35, at 643. This note further explains, "Even if those who actu-
ally traded with the defendant experience some sort of 'loss,' the number of investors who
can recover against the defendant is much larger than the number of investors who actually
traded with the defendant." Id.
40. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
41. Id. at 747.
42. Id. at 740.
43. See Note, supra note 1, at 619-20.
44. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Court
examined the congressional intent behind section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and found "no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving
manipulation or deception." Id. at 473; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
45. Fraud is referred to expressly in section (c) of the Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c)
(1988).
46. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
47. Id. at 224-25.
48. The Second Circuit had relied upon the equal access theory in convicting Chiarella.
588 F.2d 1358, 1369 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
49. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
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the absence of an affirmative duty to disclose. As Chiarella was not some-
one in whom the sellers had placed their confidence, he had no duty to
disclose and hence committed no fraud by trading on the information he
obtained."0
The Court reaffirmed its rejection of the equal access theory in Dirks v.
SEC.51 Dirks, an investment analyst, received information from a former
officer of Equity Funding of America that the corporation was replete
with fraud. Dirks disclosed this nonpublic information to his clients who
accordingly sold their Equity Funding securities. 5 2 The Court held that
Dirks was not liable because the source of the information had not
breached his duty to the Equity Funding shareholders, 3 and stated that
"the tippee's duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the
insider's duty. '54
F. Critique of the Fiduciary Duty Theory
While the fiduciary duty theory endorsed by Blue Chip Stamps,
Chiarella and Dirks successfully limits liability in private 10b-5 cases, it
also seriously impedes the SEC and government prosecutors in their ef-
forts to extinguish insider trading. Much of the trading on nonpublic in-
formation is conducted by nontraditional insiders,5 5 and the Chiarella-
Dirks rule cannot impose liability upon nontraditional insiders trading on
nonpublic information.56 Hence, the fiduciary duty rule fails to discourage
trading by people outside the corporation who gain access to material
confidential corporate information. 5
The failure of the fiduciary duty rule results from the Court's tradition-
ally narrow idea of which relationships impose the fiduciary duty required
under the Chiarella-Dirks analysis. The Second Circuit, through the ap-
plication of the misappropriation theory, has based 10b-5 liability upon
fiduciary duties other than those that run to shareholders and persons
50. Id. at 232.
51. 463 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1983).
52. Id. at 648-49.
53. Id. at 666-67.
54. Id. at 659. A tippee is one to whom a corporate insider, the tipper, discloses confiden-
tial information.
55. Aldave, supra note 1, at 112.
56. For example, in most cases the fiduciary duty theory leaves an executive of one corpo-
ration free to trade on nonpublic information about another corporation because an insider
of one company rarely has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of another company. Report
of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part I, 41 Bus. LAW. 223, 235 (1985).
57. Footnote 14 of the Dirks opinion creates a significant exception to the general fiduci-
ary duty rule. It states that "fulnder certain circumstances, such as where corporate infor-
mation is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working
for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders." Dirks, 463
U.S. at 655 n.14.
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with whom the violator trades. By placing liability on anyone who trades
on material confidential information that was wrongfully misappropri-
ated,5 the Second Circuit has significantly advanced the goals of section
10(b).
III. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
A. Development of the Theory
1. Chief Justice Burger's Dissent in Chiarella v. United States59
The misappropriation theory was originally formulated by Chief Justice
Burger in his Chiarella dissent. While generally supporting the fiduciary
duty rule,60 Chief Justice Burger asserted that the rule should not pre-
clude liability any time "an informational advantage is obtained, not by
superior experience, foresight or industry, but by some unlawful
means." 61 Thus, any person who breaches a duty62 by misappropriating
nonpublic information unlawfully acquires an informational advantage
and is liable under this theory.63
The Court did not consider the misappropriation theory in Chiarella
because the theory had not been submitted to the jury.64 Review of the
Second Circuit cases in which the theory has been applied, however, illus-
trates that it is a practical compromise between the Chiarella-Dirks6 5
analysis and the equal access rule.
2. Application of the Theory in the Second Circuit
United States v. Newman6 established the misappropriation theory as
an invaluable asset to the SEC in its struggle to eradicate insider trading.
Newman obtained confidential information from insiders of investment
banking firms concerning the proposed acquisitions of their corporate cli-
58. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. See id. at 239-40.
61. Id. at 240.
62. The misappropriation theory requires a specific duty to individuals or a corporation;
the assertion that the misappropriator owes a general duty of disclosure to the entire mar-
ketplace is an insufficient basis for liability. Aldave, supra note 1, at 115 n.76. The specific-
ity requirement was incorporated into the theory by the Second Circuit, when it rejected
Chief Justice Burger's assertion that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic informa-
tion has an absolute duty to disclose." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
63. Applying the misappropriation theory, Chiarella certainly violated 10b-5 by trading
on confidential information he received not because of his outstanding foresight, but be-
cause he "stole" that information from his employer. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 235-36.
65. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
66. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
[Vol. 24:211218
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ents. Newman purchased stock in the target companies on the basis of
this information.6 7 The Second Circuit held that his action violated 10b-5
because Newman and his tippers wronged the investment banking firms
by sullying their reputation and wronged the firms' clients as well.6 8
The court in Newman was able to overcome the absence of a duty run-
ning from the violators to the sellers by premising liability on the duty
owed by the investment bankers to their employers and employers' cli-
ents. 9 The misappropriation theory, therefore, continues to stress the fi-
duciary duty requirement,7" but does not construe this duty so narrowly
as to hinder attempts to abolish insider trading activity.71 The misappro-
priation theory endorsed by Newman should be utilized by courts outside
the Second Circuit, because of its vitality in controlling trading by non-
traditional insiders.
SEC v. Musella7s demonstrates the theory's capacity to impose 10b-5
liability on nontraditional insiders who would be free to trade with their
informational advantage under a strict interpretation of a fiduciary duty.
In Musella, bond traders were given nonpublic information by a law
firm's office manager concerning the firm's corporate clients s.7 The court
found that if it used the Chiarella-Dirks rationale, the defendants were
not liable since their tipper owed no duty to the shareholders and corpo-
rations whose securities were traded.74 Turning to a Newman analysis,
the court determined that the defendants' tipper (the office manager)
owed a duty to the law firm and to the firm's clients to refrain from trad-
ing on the basis of misappropriated corporate information. As tippees, the
defendants acquired the duty to abstain75 and hence violated 10b-5
through their trading activities. 76 Musella illustrates that the misappro-
priation theory is far more capable of furthering the goals of fairness and
67. 664 F.2d at 14-15.
68. Id. at 15. By artificially inflating the price of the target corporations' stock, Newman
and his cohorts made acquisition by the corporate clients more costly. Id. at 17.
69. Under the Dirks rule Newman, as their tippee, incurred the investment bankers' duty
to the corporation.
70. Newman, 664 F.2d at 18.
71. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
Materia illustrates the misappropriation theory's duty concept. Like Chiarella, Materia
worked for a financial printer, misappropriated confidential information from his employer,
and traded on the basis of that information. Id. at 199. The justice of his conviction under-
scores the need for the Court to adopt the misappropriation theory and properly penalize
the Chiarellas of the securities market.
72. 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
73. Id. at 431-33.
74. Id. at 436-37.
75. See Note, SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press, supra note 24, at 56 (stating that
under the misappropriation theory there is no duty to disclose; one who obtains confidential
corporate information must abstain from trading on it).
76. Musella, 578 F. Supp. at 439.
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equity than the Chiarella style fiduciary duty rule. 7
3. United States v. Carpenter7"
In Newman and Musella the court recognized a two-tiered fiduciary
duty running to both the employer and the corporate client.", While some
think a two-tiered duty should be a prerequisite for application of the
theory,80 requiring the violator to breach a duty on two levels would un-
duly restrict the utility of the misappropriation theory. Premising liabil-
ity on the existence of an employer-client duty allows employees to trade
on misappropriated information as long as the trading does not affect the
limited number of companies with which the employer deals."1 Thus, a
two-tiered duty requirement imposes an artificial barrier to liability, simi-
lar to the Chiarella requirement that a defendant owe a duty to the pur-
chaser or seller.
8 2
The Second Circuit refuted the notion that the misappropriation the-
ory required a two-tiered duty in United States v. Carpenter.83 Carpen-
ter involved Winans, an employee of the Wall Street Journal who co-
authored a financial column 4 which was widely read and significantly in-
fluenced its readers' transactions of securities.8 5 Winans used his advance
notice of the timing and content of the column to trade profitably in the
securities the column discussed,' in direct violation of Journal policy.8 7
The Second Circuit rejected the argument that "the misappropriation
theory may be applied only where the information is misappropriated by
corporate insiders or so-called quasi-insiders," ' and held that Winans vi-
77. But cf. Note, Inadequate Solution, supra note 24, at 1472 (describing Musella as
confusing).
78. 791 F.2d 1024 (1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
79. See Note, Inadequate Solution, supra note 24, at 1473.
80. See id.
81. Consider a financial analyst whose assignment is to develop predictions on the basis of
compilations of public information obtained from his employer. If the analyst traded on the
basis of his predictions, he would have violated only a duty to his employer, and hence
would not be liable under a theory requiring a two-tiered duty. The two-tiered duty require-
ment, therefore, would allow this analyst to profit from the use of nonpublic information he
stole from his employer.
82. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
83. 791 F.2d 1024 (1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
84. Id. at 1026. The column analyzed trading activity and advised investors on whether to
invest in certain stock. See Note, supra note 1, at 630.
85. Note, SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press, supra note 24, at 80.
86. 791 F.2d at 1026-27.
87. The Journal distributed a pamphlet to all of its employees detailing its conflict of
interest policy, which stressed that all news learned by an employee in the course of his
employment was company property and that any nonpublic information acquired on the job
had to be treated as confidential. Id. at 1026.
88. Id. at 1028. Quasi-insiders are those who acquire a duty to the corporation through
[Vol. 24:211
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olated 10b-5. The court found that when Winans breached his duty to his
employer, he committed a fraud sufficient to warrant 10b-5 liability."9
When United States v. Carpenter reached the Supreme Court, the Jus-
tices were split on the issue of whether Winans had violated 10b-5; hence,
they affirmed the Second Circuit's decision without commenting on the
merits of the misappropriation theory.90 While the Court's silence enables
the SEC and government prosecutors to continue to use the misappropri-
ation theory, its use could be rapidly terminated if the Court adopts the
views espoused by the many critics of the theory.
B. Criticism of the Theory
The Carpenter decision provoked a profusion of criticism. This criti-
cism focuses on the misappropriation theory's flexibility, which is per-
ceived as excessive;91 the theory's interpretation of "fraud", which is
viewed as too broad;92 and the theory's failure to compensate the people
who are most severely damaged by the illegal trading.9"
1. The Theory's "Excessive" Flexibility
Carpenter disturbs critics because they believe it warps the definition
of confidential inside information. They claim that the publication sched-
ule was not inside information because it did not issue directly from a
corporation whose stocks were traded.9 4 However, whether information
emanates from a corporation is not the crucial factor in determining if
this information is protected by 10b-5. Rather, the materiality95 and con-
fidentiality of the information determines if it is covered by Rule 10b-5.
The critics also assert that the information contained in the articles
was not confidential, but rather a compilation of the public information
gathered by Winans." While the information compiled in Winans' arti-
cles was available to the public, the analysis in the articles and the arti-
cles' publication dates were not. Advance knowledge of this information,
not of the unembellished facts gained from the individual corporations,
enabled Winans to profit in his securities transactions. 7
their tippers or Dirks' footnote 14. See supra note 57.
89. Id. at 1032.
90. 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
91. Note, supra note 1, at 637-38; see also Note, SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press,
supra note 24, at 79.
92. Note, Inadequate Solution, supra note 24, at 1481.
93. Cox & Fogarty, supra note 11, at 366.
94. Note, supra note 1, at 637-38.
95. See supra note 33.
96. Note, SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press, supra note 24, at 79.
97. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). As
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These critics assert that by flexibly construing the characteristics of
confidential information, the misappropriation theory allows courts to im-
pose criminal liability on people who do nothing more delinquent than
violate the internal rules of an organization."' These critics attach a rigid-
ness to 10b-5 that was never intended by the framers of the 1934 Act."
The framers of the 1934 Act emphasized the need to allow considerable
latitude in the administration of the Act's provisions in order to avoid an
"unworkable 'straitjacket' regulation."' 0 0 To interpret confidentiality and
inside information as narrowly as these critics suggest would counteract
the framers' intent by transforming section 10(b) of the 1934 Act into an
unworkable regulation.
2. The Theory's Broad Interpretation of Fraud
A second criticism is that the misappropriation theory overextends the
concept of fraud 1 by finding fraud where no real damages exist. 10 2 In
Carpenter, the Second Circuit determined that the damage resulting
from Winan's fraudulent trading was the harm done to the Journal's rep-
utation.'0 3 However, as there was no decline in the Journal's circulation,
it appears that no actual harm was done to the paper's integrity. 04 Be-
cause there was no perceived damage to the alleged victim of Winans'
activities, critics claim that Winans did not commit fraud and that the
court abandoned the fraud requirement, making "the reach of the securi-
ties laws limitless.' 0
5
The critics' perception of the effects of insider trading is unduly nar-
row. They focus only on a single potential victim rather than on the full
effects of the defendant's actions. While the harm to the Journal was
potential rather than actual, significant real damage was done to a large
group of unidentifiable investors. 10 6 His fraud did cause actual damage,
the effect of the articles on the public's trading activities was the crucial factor in Winans'
scheme, the timing of the articles' publication was material. Since the future publication
dates were not known to the public, they were clearly confidential. Additionally, it is diffi-
cult to accept the critics' assertion that the information was not confidential in light of the
Journal's stated policy. See supra note 87.
98. Note, Inadequate Solution, supra note 24, at 1479.
99. The Senate Report on the Act emphasized that "so delicate a mechanism as the mod-
ern stock exchange cannot be regulated efficiently under a rigid statutory program." 5 EL-
LENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 20, at 5.
100. Id.
101. See Note, Inadequate Solution, supra note 24, at 1481.
102. A basic element of fraud is damage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979).
103. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032 (1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
104. Note, SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press, supra note 24, at 81.
105. Note, Inadequate Solution, supra note 24, at 1481.
106. Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and Its Aftermath, 49 OHIo ST.
L.J. 373, 379 (1988) (explaining that "[t]he defendants inflicted concrete economic injuries
on those anonymous investors who were induced by the defendants' trading to buy or sell
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since investors relied on Winans' column in their decision making and
substantial damage was done to these investors because of this reliance. 10 7
The absence of a link between the party to whom the breach of duty
relates and the persons who are most severely damaged has caused critics
to deem the misappropriation theory "merely a pretext for enforcing
equal opportunity in information."'08 Yet there exists an important dis-
tinction between the misappropriation and equal access theories. Where
the equal access standard imposed liability upon anyone trading on the
basis of inside information regardless of how that information was ob-
tained,10 9 the misappropriation theory requires that the inside informa-
tion be acquired wrongfully." The misappropriation theory penalizes
those who secure informational advantages through deceitful means. Un-
like the equal access theory, however, it does not impose liability on in-
vestors who acquire material, nonpublic information through skill"' or
good fortune."
2
securities on unfavorable terms, or were preempted by the defendants' trading from buying
or selling securities on favorable terms.").
107. "Elements of a cause of action for fraud include false representation of a present or
past fact made by defendant, action in reliance thereupon by plaintiff, and damage resulting
to plaintiff from such misrepresentation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (5th ed. 1979). Al-
though this standard definition of fraud refers to plaintiff and defendant, it may also be
applied in the context of criminal and SEC actions involving insider trading. See Aldave,
supra note 106, at 379.
108. Cox & Fogarty, supra note 11, at 366. These critics point to the fact that the fraud
must be committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" (Rule 10b-
5(c)). They claim that because the fraud in Carpenter was not committed on a purchaser or
seller of securities, it does not satisfy the "in connection with" element. Again, their inter-
pretation of 10b-5 is unduly limiting. As the purpose of Winans' misappropriation was to
financially benefit from securities transactions, his fraud quite obviously was "in connection
with the purchase or sale" of securities. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1032
(1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
109. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969) (stating "The core of Rule 10b-5 is the implementation of the Congressional
purpose . . . that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical market
risks .... ").
110. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
240-42 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing his opinion that anyone who misappropriates
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose or refrain from trading).
111. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031.
112. The case of SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) illustrates this dis-
tinction between the equal access and misappropriation theories. Switzer overheard a corpo-
rate insider discussing nonpublic information and later used this information to determine
his securities trading choices. The court did not impose 10b-5 liability in this case as neither
the corporate insider nor Switzer breached a fiduciary duty. Id. at 765. Switzer's result em-
phasizes the fairness of distributing liability on the basis of wrongfulness. It certainly would
not have been fair to hold a man liable for simply taking advantage of his good fortune, yet
this would have been the result had the court applied the equal access theory. Thus, Switzer
refutes the notion that the misappropriation theory is merely the old equal access theory
under a new name. But cf. United States v. Reed. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
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3. The Theory's Failure to Compensate Investors
While the misappropriation theory justly determines liability, some
critics feel it unjustly denies a cause of action for the real victims of the
securities fraud.113 Such critics fail to consider the pivotal role a fiduciary
duty plays in establishing 10b-5 liability. A plaintiff cannot bring an ac-
tion against the employee of a company that owes him no fiduciary duty,
because he cannot establish the existence of a duty between himself and
that employee.114 With no such duty, the employee has not directly de-
frauded the plaintiff; the plaintiff is merely part of the investing public
that has been adversely affected by the fraud perpetrated on the viola-
tor's employer. To grant these plaintiffs standing to sue for damages
would go against the rule in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'"
and provoke the type of "vexatious litigation" that the rule was designed
to abort. 1
6
The extreme difficulty of accurately determining damages further justi-
fies the courts' unwillingness to apply the misappropriation theory to pri-
vate actions.1 1 7 Calculating the pecuniary loss to a plaintiff trading con-
temporaneously with the defendant is a speculative venture, because
factors other than the misappropriator's trading activity can often affect
changes in securities pricing."18 Awarding damages thus often results in
an unjustifiable redistribution of wealth. The courts' unwillingness to use
the misappropriation theory to grant damage awards to plaintiffs who
lack a fiduciary duty towards defendants illustrates that the theory can
successfully fulfill the policy goals of Rule 10b-5 without imposing the
draconian liability that developed out of the equal access rule." 9
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY
The misappropriation theory provides a means of restoring integrity
and fairness to the securities market without unduly punishing investors
who act without wrongful intent and without unjustifiably rewarding in-
vestors to whom the violators owed no duty. It is a practical tool for de-
other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. See Cox & Fogarty, supra note 11, at 366.
114. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984). This case established that the misappropriation theory would not apply in
civil actions for damages. Following United States v. Newman, Moss determined that "an
employer's duty to 'abstain or disclose' with respect to his employer should (not) be
stretched to encompass an employee's 'duty of disclosure' to the general public." Id.
115. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
116. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Moss, 719 F.2d at 16.
117. But cf. FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1988) (granting standing to
plaintiff corporation to which defendant 10b-5 violators owed no fiduciary duty).
118. Note, supra note 35, at 645-46.
119. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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termining 10b-5 liability that should be used throughout the federal court
system. Whether the theory will be universalized depends ultimately on
the Supreme Court's acceptance or rejection of the theory. 2 '
A. United States v. Carpenter 1 21
Because the Court in Carpenter was "evenly divided with respect to
the convictions under the securities laws,' 2 2 their decision did not deter-
mine whether the misappropriation theory is valid. There is no way to
determine how each of the individual Justices voted on the 10b-5 issue in
Carpenter, with the exception of Justice White who seemingly endorsed
the theory in his discussion of the mail and wire fraud counts. Through-
out his discussion, Justice White stressed the significance of the em-
ployee-employer fiduciary duty."23 His emphasis on this duty suggests
that he would find its breach by a misappropriator of confidential securi-
ties information critical enough to justify imposition of 10b-5 liability.
B. Predictions based upon Chiarella v. United States" 4
While it is impossible to determine how the other members of the
Court voted on the misappropriation issue in Carpenter, the views of
some of these Justices can be discerned from Chiarella. Of the five Jus-
tices who issued separate decisions in Chiarella, four remain on the
Court. Analysis of their decisions gives some indication of how they would
decide a typical insider trading case in which liability is based on the
misappropriation theory." 5
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Chiarella, detailed argu-
ments for and against the misappropriation theory but did not comment
on whether he approved of the theory. His articulation of the theory dif-
fers from that of the Second Circuit, for it focuses on a duty owed by the
120. There is also the possibility that each of the federal circuits will adopt the misappro-
priation theory independently. Thus far, only three circuits in addition to the Second Cir-
cuit have applied the theory: the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Clark, 699 F.Supp. 839 (W.D.
Wash. 1988); the Seventh Circuit in FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1988); and
the Third Circuit in Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3rd. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1017 (1987).
121. 791 F.2d 1024 (1986), afl'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); see supra notes 78-90 and accompa-
nying text.
122. 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
123. Id. at 27-28.
124. 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
125. Carpenter is atypical because it does not deal with misappropriation of confidential
information that has been entrusted to employers by clients preparing to undergo corporate
acquisitions, as United States v. Newman and SEC v. Musella did. Thus, it is possible that
some of the Justices who rejected the misappropriation theory in Carpenter did so because
they believed it was inapplicable to the facts, not because they found the theory itself inva-
lid. See Aldave, supra note 106, at 375.
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employee to the acquiring company.126 His focus on the duty owed by the
employee to the acquiring company indicates that Justice Stevens be-
lieves the misappropriation theory requires a two-tiered duty.127 The ab-
sence of the second tier 2 " could have caused Justice Stevens to vote
against imposing liability in Carpenter; however, he may well support the
use of the misappropriation theory in cases where a duty can be traced to
both the employer and the client.
Justice Brennan in Chiarella clearly endorsed the misappropriation
theory in his concurrence, stating "a person violates §10(b) whenever he
improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic information
which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.""' 9 As Winans clearly violated 10b-5 according to this standard,
Brennan probably would have found Winans guilty of a 10b-5 violation.
In his dissent in Chiarella, Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Mar-
shall joined, dispensed with the fiduciary duty requirement and stated
that any manipulative trading "lies close to the heart of what the securi-
ties laws are intended to prohibit."' 30 While they held that the misappro-
priation theory is not necessary to find liability where the trader's actions
are wrongful,"' Blackmun and Marshall implied that they would not re-
ject the misappropriation theory. Justices Blackmun and Marshall proba-
bly would have supported application of the theory in Carpenter.
The analysis of the concurrences and dissents in Chiarella suggests
that if a standard nontraditional insider trading case were to come before
the Court tomorrow, use of the misappropriation theory would be upheld.
Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall, who would have most
likely supported use of the theory in Carpenter, would be joined by Jus-
tice Stevens as a standard nontraditional insider case involves a two-
tiered duty. However, if a case involving only a single-tiered duty were to
come before the Court, the fate of the misappropriation theory would be
determined by Justice Kennedy."'3
126. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237-38 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
128. In Carpenter, the Journal had no corporate client to whom Winans could have owed
a duty.
129. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring). Although Justice Brennan
accepted the Chief Justice's theory, he concurred with the majority because he found the
jury had not been instructed with respect to the misappropriation theory. Id. at 239.
130. Id. at 246 (Blackmun, J. and Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 245.
132. Justice Kennedy did not come onto the Court in time to hear Carpenter. Justice
Kennedy would hold the crucial vote in a single-tiered duty case because, presumptively,
Justice Stevens would not uphold a conviction arrived at through the misappropriation the-
ory if no two-tiered duty existed.
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C. The Influence of Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy's stance on the misappropriation theory is not easily
anticipated. According to one of Justice Kennedy's critics, "He wants less
government and he wants to let the marketplace rule.' 133 Freedom of the
marketplace implies allowing those who obtain information from corpo-
rate insiders to freely trade without incurring liability."" On the other
hand, the misappropriation theory may enhance market freedom by in-
suring that the market is not controlled by a small group of corporate
insiders," 5 and hence receive Justice Kennedy's approval. However, most
economists agree that insider trading does not account for the general
public's failure to invest in securities, and hence stricter prohibitions on
insider trading would not affect the public's market participation."36
Therefore, it is likely that Kennedy will view the misappropriation theory
as a restraint upon the free-market system and refuse to endorse its use.
Further evidence that Justice Kennedy will not support use of the the-
ory in a single-tier duty case is his tendency to focus on the "plain mean-
ing" of statutes which he interprets."37 Emphasis on the "plain meaning"
of Rule 10b-5 may persuade Kennedy to invalidate convictions based
upon a breach of a single duty. As noted previously, strict construction-
ists criticize the misappropriation theory's broad interprQtation of fraud
which enables liability to be imposed in single-tier duty cases." 8 There-
fore, if Kennedy chooses to focus only on the "plain meaning" of the lan-
133. Williams, The Opinions of Anthony Kennedy: No Time for Ideology, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1, 1988, at 60 (quoting Junior Bridge, N.O.W. spokeswoman). Justice Kennedy's decision in
American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. State of Washington,
770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) prompted this criticism. In AFSCME, Justice Kennedy, writ-
ing for the court, determined that the federal courts could not prohibit the state from pay-
ing a higher wage in male-dominated jobs than for comparable female-dominated jobs. Ac-
cording to Kennedy the courts could not "interfere in the market-based system for the
compensation of ... employees." Id. at 1408.
134. See Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, in ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 317 (J.A. Dorn & H.G. Manne ed. 1987). Professor Manne feels
strict government proscription of insider trading restricts market freedom by limiting a cor-
poration's ability to create its own policies regarding insider trading. Id. at 324. Addition-
ally, Professor Manne views regulation of insider trading as an attempt by the government
to reallocate wealth and hence adverse to our democratic system. Id. at 326; see also Wolf-
son, Civil Liberties and Regulation of Insider Trading, in ECONoMIc LIBERTIES AND THE
JUDICIARY 329 (J.A. Dorn & H. G. Manne ed. 1987) (discussing Carpenter as illustrating how
insider trading regulation violates the first amendment).
135. See Cox & Fogarty, supra note 11, at 354-57. The misappropriation theory's ability
to impose liability on a larger group of traders should increase investors' confidence in the
fairness of the securities market, and thus encourage more investment by the general public.
Id. at 354.
136. E.g., id.
137. Schwartz, Kennedy: The Newest Justice Stakes Out His Position: The "Gray Mar-
ket" Case, "Plain Meaning" and Other Portents, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 30, 1988, at S2, coil..
138. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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guage in 10b-5, he will probably not endorse use of the theory to find
liability in a single-tier duty case.
Review of Kennedy's Ninth Circuit decisions shows, however, that
while Kennedy does look toward statutory language, he considers that
language in conjunction with the legislative history of the statute.1 9 For
example in United States v. Crocker National Corporation4 0 Kennedy,
disagreeing with the majority's broad interpretation of the term "banks"
in Section 8 of the Clayton Act, emphasized the congressional intent be-
hind the statutory language."" As the congressional intent behind the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 was to eliminate "methods . . .employed
by large operators and those possessing inside information regarding cor-
porate affairs . . . [which have] been contributing causes to losses to in-
vestors,"'4 2 Kennedy may see application of the misappropriation theory
in single-tier cases as a means of advancing congressional goals and may
support such an application.
The ultimate determination of Justice Kennedy's probable stance on
the misappropriation theory requires a balancing of Kennedy's free mar-
ket bias and his concern with legislative intent. Kennedy's focus on legis-
lative intent is most evident in cases where this focus leads to enhanced
market freedom.143 Therefore, it is unlikely that he will allow vague con-
gressional references to "methods" employed by "those with inside infor-
mation" to persuade him to favor a decision which will hinder greater
individual freedom in the market. Kennedy will probably not endorse use
of the misappropriation theory in a single-tier duty case such as Carpen-
ter unless Congress expressly authorizes such use.
D. Congressional Action Regarding Insider Trading and the Misappro-
priation Theory
Two bills regarding insider trading have come before Congress in the
past two years. 44 Only the later bill, The Insider Trading and Securities
139. E.g., American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. State of Washington,
770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
140. 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).
141. Id. at 456 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
142. 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 20, at 3.
143. See Crocker, 656 F.2d at 456.
144. Prior to the proposition of these two bills, Congress enacted two new statutes
designed to curb insider trading activity. First, Congress amended section 14(e) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 with passage of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
This amendment proscribed fraudulent practices in the tender offer context, id., and au-
thorized the SEC to promulgate Rule 14(e)-3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989). Rule 14(e)-3
imposes a duty to abstain from trading upon anyone in possession of material, nonpublic
information regarding a tender offer, regardless of whether that person owes a fiduciary
duty. See Phillips & Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need For Legislative Repair, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 95 (1984).
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Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988145 (the "1988 Act") was accepted. While
the 1988 Act increases the penalties for insider trading' 46 and legitimizes
private causes of action for contemporaneous traders,"' it fails to clearly
define the crime. This failure does not, however, result from an inability
to formulate a definition of insider trading, for such a definition was in-
cluded in the earlier bill not yet approved by Congress known as the In-
sider Trading Proscription Act of 1987 ("ITPA").148
The ITPA, introduced to the 100th Congress as Senate Bill 1380, con-
tains a broad definition of insider trading which incorporates the misap-
propriation theory."4 Like the misappropriation theory, the ITPA
stresses the wrongfulness of the trader's means of acquiring inside infor-
mation.150 However, the ITPA's definition of wrongful acquisition is much
broader than that of the misappropriation theory. Under the proposed
ITPA, liability is imposed upon any person trading on the basis of non-
public information who "knows or recklessly disregards that such infor-
mation has been obtained wrongfully" and whose trading "would consti-
tute, directly or indirectly. . . any. . . breach of a fiduciary duty, breach
of any personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of
any contractual or employment relationship."'' By eliminating Rule 10b-
5's fraud requirement 5'2 and enlarging the, class of duties which, if
breached, would lead to liability, the ITPA provides a clear means of con-
sistently convicting insider traders in single-tier duty cases.
While the ITPA advances the policy goals of 10b-5153 as successfully as
the misappropriation theory does, it also contains provisions allowing for
private causes of action which would lead to the draconian damages the
Congress also passed the Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A)
(Supp. III 1985). The act provided civil penalties to be imposed upon anyone violating the
1934 Act and anyone aiding or abetting such a violator. The main significance of the 1984
act was that it increased the maximum fine for those guilty of insider trading from $10,000
to $100,000.
145. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988).
146. The 1988 Act increases the maximum fine accompanying a conviction for insider
trading from $100,000 to $1,000,000 and increases the maximum jail sentence from five to
ten years. Id. at 4678.
147. Id. at 4680. The 1988 Act declares that limited damages may be granted to traders
who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of securities to which the violation re-
lates, purchased (if the violation is based upon a sale of securities) or sold (if the violation is
based upon a purchase of securities) securities of the same class. Id.
148. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,202 (Nov. 16, 1987).
149. See id. at 88,916 (proposed 1934 Act § 16(A)(b)(1)).
150. Aldave, supra note 106, at 385.
151. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 84,202, at 88,916 (Nov. 16, 1987) (proposed 1934 Act § 16(A)(b)(1)); see Aldave,
supra note 106, at 386.
152. See Aldave, supra note 106, at 385-87.
153. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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courts have avoided through their use of the misappropriation theory.
Proposed section 16(A)(g)(1) 1 " asserts that damages may be recovered
not only by those who traded contemporaneously with the violators, but
also by any person "injured by violation of this section in connection with
such person's purchase or sale of securities."' 15 It appears that because of
the near impossibility of identifying the investors who are actually, rather
than potentially, harmed by the violator's trading,156 the framers of the
ITPA chose to grant the entire class of potential victims a windfall.151
The proposed act therefore, unlike the misappropriation theory, fails to
strike a balance between furtherance of Rule 10b-5's goals and avoidance
of unjust compensation of "lucky" investors.1 5 8 The draconian nature of
the ITPA was, in fact, a primary cause of its rejection by Congress.159
Both the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 and the ITPA demonstrate continued congressional concern with
curing the insider trading epidemic. Furthermore, the ITPA's incorpora-
tion of the misappropriation theory and its capacity to impose liability in
single-tier duty cases illustrate that Congress has considered codification
of the theory as it was applied in Carpenter. Significantly, it does not
appear that Congress rejected the ITPA because it disapproved of the
misappropriation theory. Rather, Congress apparently rejected the pro-
posed act because it viewed its damages provision as draconian. Since the
misappropriation theory does not lead to oppressive damages, it appears
likely that Congress would accept a bill that incorporates the theory as it
was used by the Second Circuit in Carpenter.1 60
V. CONCLUSION
To insure that nontraditional insiders such as Winans will not be able
to use their positions to exploit the investing public, the Court needs to
endorse the misappropriation theory as it was used by the Second Circuit
in Carpenter. Such an endorsement would conform with general congres-
sional notions of insider trading, as the Insider Trading Proscription Act
illustrated congressional willingness to accept the misappropriation the-
ory's use in single-tier duty cases. Only if the Court accepts a theory im-
posing liability even when just a single-tiered duty exists will the govern-
154. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16(A)(g)(1) (1987), reprinted in [Current] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,202, at 88,917 (Nov. 16, 1987).
155. Id. The proposed ITPA differs from the 1988 Act accepted by Congress, in that the
1988 Act limits the class of plaintiffs to those who traded contemporaneously with the Act's
violators. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
156. See Note, supra note 35, at 643 & n.228.
157. See Note, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
158. See id.
159. Bahls, This Little Piggy Went To Market, Student Lawyer, Oct. 1989, at 18.
160. But cf. id. at 22 (noting that Congress is not likely to pass the ITPA in the near
future).
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ment be able to successfully implement the goals of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Christine Marra

